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Abstract 
We consider a Bayesian public goods environment with independent private valua­
tions, where a public good can be produced at constant returns to scale, up to some 
capacity. We fully characterize the interim efficient allocation rules and prove that they 
correspond to decision rules based on a virtual cost-benefit criterion, together with the 
appropriate incentive taxes. Compared to the classical Lindahl-Samuelson solution there 
are generally distortions that depend on the welfare weights because the efficient way to 
reduce the tax burden on low-valuation (resp: high-valuation) types is to reduce (resp:
increase) the level of provision of the public good. Second, we explore the implementation
of efficient allocations by means of simple, dominant strategy voting rules, called refer­
enda. In a referendum, individuals vote for or against production of the public good. If 
a sufficiently large fraction vote in favor, the good is provided at maximum capacity and 
costs are distributed equally across the population. Otherwise the good is not produced. 
We prove that for each interim efficient allocation rule there exists a referendum that 
approximates that achieves the same total surplus in large populations. Furthermore, if 
there is common value uncertainty in addition to the private valuations uncertainty, then 
the approximately optimal referendum is unique. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the following classical public goods problem. A group .of 
individuals must decide on a level of a public good that is produced according to constant 
returns to scale up to some capacity constraint. In addition to deciding the level of 
public good, the group must decide how to tax the individuals in the group in order to 
cover the cost. The distribution of the burden of taxation is important because different 
individuals have different marginal rates of substitution between the private good (taxes) 
and the public good, and may have different incomes as well. These individual marginal 
rates of substitution are private information; that is, each individual knows his or her 
own marginal rate of substitution, but not those of the other members of the group. 
Adopting a Bayesian mechanism design framework, we assume that the distribution of 
marginal rates of substitution is common knowledge. 
We are interested in characterizing efficiency in this environment and are also in­
terested in characterizing those mechanisms that one might expect to actually arise in 
practice. This suggests two approaches, one from normative considerations and one from 
positive considerations. On the normative side, we ask: What should an active planner 
(a mechanism designer) do? A well-known special case of this problem has been solved
for one particular social welfare function (e.g. d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 1979) that
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is insensitive to the distribution of cost shares. What distinguishes our work here is 
that we consider a planner who is maximizing a welfare function that is sensitive to the 
allocation of cost shares over the different valuation-types. Simply put, the planner may 
care who pays. This is represented formally by type-contingent welfare weights. 
Why might the consideration of such distributional goals be relevant? What rationale 
could ever be given for non-constant welfare weights? Perhaps the simplest example to · 
answer these questions corresponds to public decisions with zero production costs. Such 
cases are well-approximated in the real world by social legislation such as blue laws, 
smoking and drinking prohibitions, clothing requirements at beaches, and so forth. Sup­
pose one is considering the implementation of one such social regulation. Many would 
argue that if implementation takes place, then the losers (i.e. those with a negative
valuation to the proposed regulation) should be compensated.1 But one runs into the 
(incentive compatibility) problem that if you naively say you are going to compensate
all losers, then everyone will claim to be a loser, possibly leading to production never 
occurring .. A planner might want, therefore, to give some weight to the losers but not to 
the exclusion of all others. Obviously, in order to compensate the losers in such decisions, 
incentive taxes need to. be carefully constructed which will achieve such type-contingent 
redistribution, at least to the extent limited by incentive compatibility constraints. As 
we will show below, there is a direct and intuitive link between the desired degree of 
such compensation and the corresponding distortions away from the Lindahl-Samuelson 
optimum. In this particular example, significant compensation of losers would necessi­
tate a corresponding degree of underproduction relative to the classic solution. Other 
weighting schemes would correspond to other type-distributional goals, and could lead 
to either under- or overproduction. 
A second reason to consider non-constant welfare weights is evident if one concedes 
that this partial equilibrium model is embedded in a richer general equilibrium structure, 
where income or wealth distribution is a goal of the planner. If preferences for the public 
good are correlated with income or wealth in a systematic way, then the public good 
mechanism can be used as an instrument for redistribution, and unequal welfare weights 
would be a reflection of the planner's redistributive goals. 
A third rationale for unequal weights is more direct. For reasons which may have 
to do only remotely with issues of compensating losers or wealth redistribution, certain 
kinds of type-dependent cost-sharing may be deemed desirable on their own merits. A 
classic example of this is the class of proportional cost-sharing rules, whereby individuals 
valuing the public good more should bear a proportionally larger share of the costs (e.g.
Jackson and Moulin 1992). Such normative goals would correspond to a system of welfare 
weights that decrease in type in a particular way. 
For the positive approach to the mechanism design problem, we ask: What would 
we expect to see in practice? Here we are looking for a concept of efficiency or stability 
because we would expect inefficient or unstable mechanisms to be replaced by others. 
1Sometimes, this requirement is implicitly imposed as a voluntary participation constraint. 
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Under complete information, these concept.s correspond to Pareto optimality and the 
core, respectively. Under asymmetric information the problem is a bit more subtle, and 
there remains no true consensus on the appropriate equivalent concepts. 2 We therefore 
take a minimalist approach, and look at a natural extension of Pareto optimality to 
asymmetric information. In the analysis below we assume that all decisions, including 
whether to change the mechanism, are made at the interim stage - that is, when each 
agent knows his or her type, but not anyone else's type. If there is no communication, then 
the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms consists of those incentive compatible 
mechanisms for which it cannot be common knowledge that there is another mechanism 
which generates a unanimous improvement. We would expect therefore that surviving 
institutions would be interim incentive efficient. 
Luckily we do not have to choose between normative and positive approaches to this 
problem. As pointed out in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) , a mechanism is interim 
efficient if and only if there exist type-dependent social welfare weights for which that 
mechanism solves the planners optimization problem subject to feasibility and incentive 
compatibility constraints. Thus, by varying the welfare weights in our planner's prob­
lem, we map out the entire set of mechanisms which are interim incentive efficient. Thus, 
a complete solution to this problem, posed either from a normative or positive stand­
point, is equivalent to fully characterizing the set of interim efficient mechanisms for the 
production of public goods in this framework. 
A complete characterization of interim efficiency has been done for the special case 
where the types are identically distributed and can only take on two values (Ledyard and 
Palfrey 1994). There it was shown that optimal production always takes a special form 
in which the public good is provided if and only if the number of high valuation types 
exceeds a threshold number which depends on the welfare weights and the distribution 
of types. The greater the welfare weight on high valuation types, the lower the optimal 
threshold. With more than two types (as in this paper) the optimal mechanism generally 
depends on the exact profile of types in a more complicated way. In the first half of this 
paper, we characterize interim efficient mechanisms and obtain some comparative statics 
about how the optimal mechanism changes with the underlying distribution of types and 
with the welfare weights of the welfare function. 
In the second half of the paper, we look deeper at the positive question of what 
mechanisms we might expect to see in practice, by investigating the optimality properties 
of simple, dominant strategy voting mechanisms. We show that in large populations the 
performance of the optimal mechanisms can be approximated by using binary voting 
schemes in which the public good is produced (at maximum capacity) if and only if a 
threshold proportion of "yes" votes is met, and costs are shared equally by all types of all 
agents. Otherwise there is no production. We call such schemes referenda. In particular 
we show that for every interim efficient mechanism there is a referendum such that the 
aggregate welfare achieved from the voting scheme converges, as the population grows, 
2See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), Cramton and Palfrey (1995), and Crawford (1985) for good 
discussions of the difficulties of extending these concepts to asymmetric information. 
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to the aggregate welfare achieved from the interim efficient mechanism. Moreover, if 
the distribution of valuations is not known precisely by the planner, then the optimal 
referendum is uniquely determined. 
2 The Model
There are N people who must decide on the quantity, q of a public good that is produced 
according to constant returns to scale and has a maximum level Y = 1. The cost of 
producing q E [O, 1] is equal to K q. In addition, they must decide how to distribute the 
production costs. Because of the linear production technology, the optimal level of the 
public good will always be either 0 or 1, so this is equivalent to a problem of deciding on 
whether or not to produce a discrete public good. We let ai denote individuals i's share 
of the cost, in units of the consumption of the private good, and assume it can take any 
real value. Therefore the set of feasible levels of production and cost shares are given by 
such that 
(a 1, . . .  ' a N' q) E �N x [ 0' 1]
N 
with Kq �:Lai. 
i=l 
Individual preferences are assumed to be risk-neutral and quasilinear in the level of 
public good production and the taxes (cost shares) , so the utility to type vi of agent i 
for an allocation (q, a) is given by
Thus, vi represents the marginal rate of substitution between the public and private good, 
or "public good valuation" of type vi . We refer to vi as player i's "value." We assume 
that each individual knows his own value, vi , and does not know the values of the other 
individuals. We assume that the individual values (vi) are independently distributed, 
with the (common knowledge) cdf of i's value denoted Fi (·) and the support of Fi is
Vi = [Qi , vi] , where Qi < K/N <vi. We assume Fi has a continuous positive density on
Vi. Note that Qi < 0 is allowed.
Clearly under these assumptions, our choice of normalization of the utility function 
is arbitrary up to an affine transformation. In particular, it is equivalent (in terms of 
individual decision theory) to the models of asymmetric information about contribution 
costs (ai ) ,  where utilities are normalized3 so that the marginal utility of the public good 
3This normalization can be made as long as 'Qi > 0. 
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(v) equals 1. So that ui = q - (�. )ai. However,the class of ex-ante incentive efficient
mechanisms (in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson 1983) will be different under the
two normalizations. 4 So, below, we will focus on the set of interim-incentive efficient 
mechanisms. That set is independent of whatever (type dependent) normalization one
chooses. 
A mechanism consists of a message space for each agent and an outcome function 
mapping message profiles into probability distributions over the set of feasible alloca­
tions. By the revelation principle, the properties (in terms of allocations) of any optimal
mechanism can be duplicated by an incentive compatible, direct mechanism in which the 
message space for agent i is simply the set of possible types (values) in the support of
Fi. A strategy for i is a mapping ai : Vi --7 Vi, that is, a decision rule that specifies a
reported type for each possible type. We refer to the identity mapping as the truthful 
strategy. By the linearity of the individual utility functions, there is also no loss in re­
stricting attention to deterministic mechanisms. Thus, we will denote a feasible direct 
mechanism simply as a function 
N 
T/ :  yN--* {(a1, ... ,aN,q) E RN x (O, l ] I L ai � Kq}.
i=l 
We denote the public good allocation component of T/ at type profile v by q( v) , and
the private good tax for i by ai ( v).
Besides feasibility, the main restriction on 'f/ is that it be incentive compatible, which 
means that it is a Bayesian equilibrium of TJ for all agents to adopt a strategy of truthfully
reporting their type. Given a strategy profile ai : Vi --* Vi and a mechanism, TJ, let the
interim utility of type vi of agent i, assuming all others truthfully report their type, be 
denoted by: 
Let ui(TJ, vi) = ui(TJ, vi, I) where I denotes the truthful strategy I(v) = v. Then T/ is
incentive compatible if and only if ui(TJ, vi) � ui(TJ, v\ai) for all vi, ai.
The set of interim incentive efficient allocation rules5 can be represented as the so­
lutions to a set of maximization problems. Let A > 0 be a system of welfare weights, a
measurable function mapping types into the positive real line, so that A( vi) represents
the welfare weight assigned to type vi of agent i. Then T/ is interim efficient if and only
4The fact that ex ante efficiency is sensitive to utility normalizations is discussed in Ledyard and 
Palfrey 1994 (p. 333). 
5For the remainder, we simply refer to such allocations as "interim efficient.,,
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if there is a;\ such that 'T/ maximizes L,i J;/ Ai(vi)ui(TJ, vi)dFi(vi) over the set of feasible
and incentive compatible mechanisms. 6 -
We now proceed to characterize this set. 
3 The Characterization
As indicated above, we represent interim efficient rules as a solution to a constrained 
maximization problem. First we need to identify incentive compatible mechanisms in a 
useful way. 
For smooth mechanisms, when preferences are linear, the characterization of incentive 
compatibility in terms of derivatives is well-known. There are basically two features 
of such mechanisms. First, an envelope condition is satisfied, namely that the total 
derivative of the interim utility for i with respect to type when players adopt truthful 
strategies is equal to the partial derivative with respect to type (i.e., fixing the reports
of all agents). Second,· the interim utility to i under truthful reporting is convex in i's
type. This is stated formally below. 
Lemma (Rochet, 1987): If ui linear in vi and 'T/ is twice continuously differenti able,
then 'T/ is incentive compatible if and only if 
'VviUi(7J, vi) = 'Vviili(TJ, Vi, J) (i) 
ui(7J, vi) is convex in vi. (ii) 
For our problem \Jv;ui(TJ, vi) = Qi( vi) = fv-i q(v)dF(v I vi). So ui is convex in viif and only if Qi'( vi) 2: 0 V vi. Using these facts we can see that a mechanism (q ,  a) is
interim efficient if and only if there is a ;\ such that ( q, a) solves max f v Li ;\ (vi) (vi q( v) -ai(v))dF(v) subject to 0 � q(v) :S 1 V v, Qi'(vi) 2: 0 V i, vi , \Jv;ui(vi) = \Jv;ui(vi, I) V 
i, vi , and Li ai(v) = Kq(v) V v. 
Using the approach of Mirrlees (1971) and Wilson (1993) we construct the Lagrangian 
equivalent problem 
-i 
+ � 1� 'lj}(vi) [u�;(TJ, vi) - u�;(TJ, Vi, I)] dvi
i -
+ Iv O(v) [� >'{v) - Kq(v)] dv
6See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) 
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subject to: 
0 ::::; q( v) ::::; 1 \;/ v E V 
Qi'(vi) � 0 V i, vi E Vi 
where 'I/Ji and 'Y are multipliers for (first order) incentive compatibility and feasibility, re­
spectively. Applying Green's Theorem and substituting the identity ui('TJ, vi)= ui('TJ, vi, I) 
converts the maximization problem to: 
-'l/Ji(vi)u�;('TJ, vi, I)} dvi + [ 8(v) ( � ai(v) - K q(v)) dv
+Lr . ui('TJ, Vi, J). ('l/Ji(vi)�i(vi))dvii lav• 
subject to: 
0::::; q(v)::::; 1 \;/ v EV 
Qi'(vi) � 0 V i, vi E Vi 
where avi denotes the boundary of yi and �i points outward at vi.
We are now in a position to give a complete characterization of the class of interim 
efficient mechanisms. 
Theorem 1 (q*, a*) is an interim efficient mechanism if and only if 3 A >> 0 with
-i . . . J;; ..X(vi)dFi(vi) = 1 V i, such that
and 
(a) Vv, q*(v) maximizes {Ei wi(vi) - K}
subject to: 
0 ::::; q( v) ::::; 1 \;/ v E V 
Qi'(vi) � 0 V i, vi E yi 
where 
i( i) _ i _ 1 - Fi( vi) J�
; .Ai(ti)dFi(ti)w v - v fi(vi) + fi(vi) 
. i . . . . (b) a*i(v) = I; tidQ*i(ti) + ai(v) 
where 
7 
� ai(v) = Kq*(v) - � 1� i tidQ*i (ti) \Iv
i i -
Proof: A sketch is given. For further details see Ledyard and Palfrey (1996) . 
-i . 
First notice that the restriction of .X to f:f Ai ( vi)dF( vi) = 1 V i is without loss of
generality. Since utilities are linear in the transfers, for some welfare weights total welfare 
can be made arbitrarily large simply by making ex ante transfers from one individual to 
another individual. That is, if, for two agents i and j, it were the case that 
then total welfare could be made arbitrarily large by making ex ante transfers of the 
private good from i to j. Thus, a solution to the maximization problem only exists when 
the welfare weights are, in expectation, the same for all agents. Thus, without loss of 
generality, we restrict the welfare weights to satisfy 
oo > l� Ai (s)dFi(s) = 1 Vi.
We can write (*) as 
(**) 
From the first order conditions with respect to ai (v) , 8(v) ,  and ·1/}(vi) we obtain, for 
vi <vi <vi - ' 
8 
where 7(v) = 8(v)/ J(v). 
From (1) it follows that 'Y is constant in v. Integration of (1) gives '1/i(vi) = Fi(vi)(A;( vi) - 7) + C where Ai(vi) is the expected value of Ai conditional on i's valuation
being less than or equal to vi. 
Part (b) of the theorem7 follows from (2) and (3).
Finally, the continuity of 'I/Ji along with the first order conditions for ai at '.!l.i and ff
imply that 'lj;i('.!1.i) = 'lji('if) = 0. So C = 0 and 'Y = f$ Ai(vi)dFi(vi) = 1. Substituting allof this into (**) implies that we must find q* to solve 
QED 
subject to : 
0 ::; q( v) ::; 1 V v E V 
Qi'(vi) 2 0 V i, vi E Vi 
4 Interpreting the Characterization
Call wi(vi) = vi- i(�:J(Ai(vi) - l), type vi of agent i's virtual valuation (a la Myerson) .
Suppose8 w�(vi) 2 0 Vi, vi. Then, since Qi*( vi)= prob(E#i wj(vi) 2 K - wi(vi)) it willbe true that Qi'( vi) 2 0 is never binding. So for (A, F) such that w�( vi) 2 OVi, vi, interim
efficient q* ( v) satisfy
q*(v) = 1 if Liwi(vi) 2 K= 0 otherwise. 
This is a virtual cost-benefit criterion. The virtual utility has a familiar interpretation 
(see for example Myerson 1981) . It equals the "true" public good valuation of the vi-type
inflated 9 by a factor that depends on the distribution of types and on the welfare weights. 
The benchmark case is the one where Ai (vi) = 1 for all i and vi. In this case the first best
optimal level of public good is 1 or 0 depending only on whether or not Li[vi - �] 2 0.
7The existence of  such an a for any given q was first shown by d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet
(1979). One a that satisfies (bl) and (b2) is ai(v) = �[q*(v) - Q*i(vi) + N�l L#i Q*i(Vi)] -
1 f11j *. N-1 L#i Jvi SjdQ 3(sj)· 8This is the so-called "regular" case, where the second order condition is never binding. 
9This could be deflated if>.; (vi) > 1.
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That is, produce if and only if the sum of the marginal rates of substitution exceed the 
marginal production cost. This is the Lindahl-Samuelson solution, precisely the solution 
investigated in most previous papers on the optimal provision of public good. (See 
d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet 1979) . This simplification arises because the allocation 
of the private good (i.e., the incidence of the costs on different types) does not affect 
social welfare. For this reason, incentive compatibility does not reduce social welfare 
relative to the first best solution. However, it must be emphasized that this is a very 
special case. It is in fact the only system of welfare weights where incentive compatibility 
does not cause distortions relative to the first best solution.10 
To better understand the intuition behind the virtual valuations, one can think of the 
mechanism operating in the following way. Each agent (truthfully) reports a valuation. 
If the public good is produced, then each agent pays the incentive tax, which equals
a constant plus that agent's valuation minus his "informational rent" , 1j;��\)
;). Recall
from standard incentive theory that this is the amount that can be extracted from an 
agent, given incentive constraints. Of course, in this public good problem, the objective 
of the mechanism is not to extract rent from agents, so any excess incentive tax will be 
distributed lump sum back to the agents, by adjusting the incentive tax by a constant. 
Thus, if the good is provided, the government spends K to produce the public good and 
makes a lump-sum refund (which is formally captured by the constant (i.e. independent 
of vi) that is added to each agent's incentive tax. The portion of this refund that comes 
from type vi of agent i equals (vi - 1j��(;);) - i). There are two other terms that complete
the social cost/benefit picture, as it concerns type vi of agent i. One is simply that 
producing the public good, produces a direct benefit of vi to agent i, which is valued 
socially as .-\i(vi)vi . Last but not least, is the fact that the incentive tax (before refund)-i . . 1 d h' . 1 1 \ ( i) i f� >.;(ti)dF;(ti) 1s a soc1a cost, an t IS soc1a cost equa s "i v v - fi(v') 
Collecting all these terms, gives us type vi of agent i's contribution to the marginal 
net social value of producing the public good. Denoting this by W(vi) ,  gives us: 
which is the cost adjusted virtual valuation of type vi of agent i. 
10 Actually, this is the only system of welfare weights in which a first best solution exists. For any other 
weights, welfare can be arbitrarily increased by shifting the allocation of the private good to one particular 
type of some individual. Since we impose no feasibility bounds on the allocation of the private good, this 
means that the first best solution does not exist. Of course, with incentive compatibility constraints,
the second-best problem is well defined. 
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. f,. >.;(t')dF;(t') · 1-F.·(vi) 1 - Fi vi , so that Ai vi vi - ' J;(vi) = vi - J;(V') and as a result there are nowelfare costs associated with charging the incentive taxes in a type-dependent way and 
then redistributing them back in a lump sum fashion. Otherwise there is a cost to doing 
this. 
The form of virtual utilities also makes it easy to see how distortions away from the 
classic optimum are related to the welfare weights. For example, if Ai is decreasing intype then generally the interim efficient solution calls for underproduction relative to the 
Lindahl-Samuelson solution, since 'I/Ji (vi) is positive for all types. That is, the virtual
valuations are always less than true valuations, so the sum of the true valuations must 
more than exceed the production cost in order for production to be optimal. Conversely, 
if Ai is increasing in type, then there should be overproduction relative to the Lindahl­
Samuelson solution. 
The discussion above assumes monotone virtual utilities, which ensures that max­
imization of the relaxed program, without the Qi'(vi) � 0 constraint, automatically 
satisfies that constraint. It is straightforward to see what is required for virtual utilities 
to be monotone in type, and this provides a nice intuition for how our results differ from 
standard incentive problems of this type (e.g. Guesnerie and Laffont 1984) . From above,
The first term, vi, is clearly increasing in vi. The second term, (1 - F)/ f , the 
informational rent, is typically assumed to be monotone in vi in adverse selection models 
in private goods environments, by requiring the distribution to satisfy a monotone hazard 
rate condition. 
Since the incidence of incentive taxes can have welfare effects, there is a third term to 
worry about, indicating that one may need more (or less!) than the standard monotone
hazard rate condition to guarantee that Qi'( vi) � 0 is automatically satisfied when one 
simply plugs in virtual utilities and maximizes subject only to production feasibility. 
These additional conditions will imply restrictions on the distribution of welfare weights, 
as we illustrate in the following example. 
Let v be distributed uniformly on [O, 1] for all i, so F(v) = v and f(v) = 1. Then 
w(v) = 2v - J; A(t)dt and w' = 2- A(v) .  Therefore, the second order condition is globally
satisfied for uniform distributions of valuations if and only if the maximum welfare weight 
is less than or equal to 2. Thus, if A(v) = 2(a+bv)/(2a+b) , where a� 0 and 2a + b > 0,  
then we are always in the "regular" case where virtual valuations are monotonic in type 
and the second order conditions are satisfied. H b > 0 (high valuation types receive more
weight) then production will occur more often than in the Lindahl-Samuelson solution,
while if b < 0, the reverse it true. However, there are A such that the second order
11 
condition is not satisfied, even for the uniform distribution. For example, if .A( v) = 3v2 
then virtual valuations are not monotone in type; virtual valuations are decreasing for 
v > f'ii3. 
Fortunately, we can deal with these cases using a procedure called ironing. The 
principle behind this is flatten out the virtual valuations in the decreasing region (and 
often for some adjacent types as well). The trick is to choose the region is such a way 
that the measure of types whose virtual valuations are decreased by this flattening is 
balanced by types whose virtual valuations are increased. The geometry is illustrated 
nicely in a series of figures in Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) for the single agent case. For 
the example above with .X(v) = 3v2, the optimal solution in this case will involve equal 
treatment of all types with valuations above f'iJ3; Qi = 1 for all such types. Similarly,
if .A(v) = 3(1 -v)2 the second order condition is violated for v < 1 - f'iJ3, and the
optimal solution will require equal treatment of all types with sufficiently low valuations; 
Qi = 0 for all these low- valuation types. 
It is also instructive to use this example to illustrate the range of public good provision 
rules (or cost-benefit criteria) that are interim efficient. Suppose N = 2, K = 1. The 
Lindahl-Samuelson efficient outcome is to produce if and only if the average valuation 
exceeds 1/2, so the public good will be provided half the time. 
Next suppose one shifts welfare weight to the low valuation types, to the point where 
.A(v) = 2 for all v < 1/2 and .A(v) = 0 for all v > 1/2. This satisfies monotonicity of 
virtual valuations11 and it is easy to see that the optimal mechanism is to produce if 
and only if the sum of valuations exceeds 3/2. In other words, this weighting scheme 
effectively inflates the cost of the public good by 50 percent, so it should be produced 
only if the actual benefit/cost ratio exceeds 1.5. At first blush this mechanism seems 
like it could be improved on, since there are some states where both agents are "high" 
types (i.e. v > 1/2 for both of them), and the public good is not provided. Since all high 
types receive the same welfare weight, and since low types do not bear any of the cost 
of production in these states, it would seem to lead to an improvement in welfare. Why 
doesn't this lead to an improvement? The answer is that the mechanism is designed to 
achieve redistributive goals in addition to deciding on public good production. In this 
case, the welfare weights indicate that there should be a transfer from high valuation to 
low valuation types. Hence in the optimal mechanism there are some states where there 
is one low type and one high type, and the public good is not produced, but a private 
good transfer takes place between the low and high types. The extent of such transfers 
would be hindered by greater public good production due to incentive compatibility 
problems. We conjecture that this choice of welfare weights corresponds to the lowest 
possible expected output (Q = . 125) of all interim efficient mechanisms for the uniform 
11  If one shifts the welfare weights even further downward, so that >.( v) = A > 2 for all v < 1 /A
and >.(v) = O for all v > l/A, then the unadjusted virtual valuations are nonmonotonic and must be
ironed .. Nevertheless, from the characterization in Theorem 1, it is easy to verify that standard ironing 
procedures can be used and will generate an optimal mechanism with the same property: produce if and 
only if the sum of valuations exceeds 3/2. 
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case with N = 2 and K = 1. 
At the other extreme, suppose the welfare weights are shifted in the opposite direction, 
with .A(v) = 2 for all v > 1/2 and .A(v) = 0 for all v < 1/2. In this case the optimal 
mechanism is to produce if and only if the sum of valuations exceeds 1/2. In other 
words, the cost of the public good is effectively deflated by 50 percent, so that it should 
be produced if the actual benefit/cost ratio is at least .5. Again it would seem that 
efficiency would dictate that when both types are "low" types, the good should never be 
produced. However, redistributive goals implied by this welfare weighting scheme requires 
the low types to subsidize the cost of the public good. The most efficient way to perform 
this subsidization requires some "overproduction" of the public good. We conjecture 
that this choice of welfare weights corresponds to the highest possible expected output 
( Q = . 875) of all interim efficient mechanisms for the uniform case with N = 2 and 
K = 1. 
5 Simple Public Good Mechanisms
We next compare the efficiency of interim efficient mechanisms with the efficiency of 
significantly simpler mechanisms. In this section, we restrict attention to the symmetric 
case, where Fi(v) = Fj(v) = F(v) and A i (v) = Aj (v) = .A (v) for all i, v. 
5 .1 Referendum mechanisms 
We identify a class of particularly simple mechanisms, which uses a drastically smaller 
message space than the direct mechanism. In fact, each individual transmits only a single 
binary bit of information, which we call a "vote." Thus it is as if each individual is asked 
whether or not he would like to have the public good produced. If enough voters say 
"yes," then the public good is produced and the cost is shared equally. We call such 
mechanisms referenda with equal cost shares12. 
To be specific a J* -referendum has the following three properties: 
(a) Each i votes, bi , yes (= 1) or no (= 0).
(b) The good is produced if Li bi � J* and is not produced if 2: bi < J*.
( c) Each i pays � if it is produced and 0 if it is not.
12In Ledyard and Palfrey (1994) we used the term lottery draft, since equal cost sharing is equivalent 
(in expected utility) to randomly selecting, or drafting, M :::; N individuals to contribute an equal
(K / M) share to the production of the public good. If the private good space is discrete, randomization 
of this sort is needed. 
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Thus, in a J* -referendum each individual casts a vote either for or against the pro­
duction of the public good, which is produced if and only if at least J* "yes" votes are 
cast, and costs are split equally. For each voter, it is a dominant strategy to vote yes, if 
and only if vi 2:: K / N. The incentive compatible direct revelation version of this is:
q( v) = 1 iff # { ilvi 2:: �} 2:: J*
aYL(v) = �q(v) Vi
The reason for considering such mechanisms is that, as we show below, they are almost 
interim efficient in large populations. By this, we mean that the efficiency loss from using 
a referendum instead of an optimal mechanism approaches zero in large populations. The 
two extreme referenda, corresponding to J* = 0 (always produce) and J* = 1 (never
produce) , are of independent interest and we refer to these as command mechanisms.
5 .2 Approximate Optimality of Referenda 
It is fairly easy to see that in finite populations referenda are generally interim inefficient, 
except in extreme cases where the critical level of J* is equal to either 0 or N, in which 
case production is independent of the realization of the type-profile, v.13 In spite of the
inefficiency of the J* -referendum, one can obtain an approximate efficiency result when 
N is sufficiently large. In letting N grow, we permit K to vary with N, but keep k fixed, 
where k = K(N)/N. That is, the per capita production costs of the public good are held 
fixed. 
5.3 Per Capita Welfare Losses from Referenda 
For any given set of welfare weights, >., consider the ]*-referendum with the property 
that the expected sum of virtual utilities, if exactly J* individuals vote for production 
of the public good, is equal to kN. For this voting rule, asymptotically in N, the public 
good will be produced if and only if the average virtual utility is greater than or equal to 
k. By the law of large numbers, this will therefore almost surely produce the optimal level
of public good. (Either full production or zero production depending on whether average
virtual utility exceeds or falls short of k.) Also, since the interim expected public good 
production (Qi( vi)) is type independent in the limit, incentive compatibility requires thatthe interim-expected optimal taxes approach equal cost shares as the number of agents 
goes to infinity. Therefore, in the limit as the number of agents goes to infinity, the J* 
referendum generates the same per-capita expected welfare as the optimal mechanism. 
13 An example of this arises when vi is distributed on the [1, 2) interval for all i, and i < 1. In this
special case, production is always optimal independent of the actual draws of v. Of course, in this case, 
there is no need to elicit messages from the agents at all. So J* = 0 is efficient. 
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If there is a per-capita cost to operating a mechanism that is increasing in the size 
of the message space, then for a sufficiently large number of agents voting rules outper­
form the "optimal" mechanism computed in the previous section of this paper. This is 
demonstrated formally below. 
Consider a sequence of JN--referenda where JN-= j* N is set14 such that the expected 
total virtual utility, if exactly j* fraction of individuals vote "yes," equals kN. Denoting 
w+ = E[w; v > k] and w- = E[w; v < k], this requires choosing j* so that j*w+ + (1  -
j*)w- = k. What we do below is to replicate the economy, keeping the distribution of 
individual types constant and also keeping the per capita cost of producing the public 
good constant, and compare the per capita surplus using this j* rule to the per capita 
surplus using the optimal rule, and show that in the limit they are the same. 
Theorem 2 Let KN = kN, k fixed. Let Ai(vi) = ..\ (vi) and fi (vi) = f(vi)Vi. Let j*
satisfy j*w+ + (1 - j*)w- = k. As N----+ oo the referendum mechanism using JN-= j* N 
is almost interim-efficient in the sense that it satisfies (I) and (F) and
� � 1� ..\ ( .vi)u\17�L, vi)dF(vi) -t � � 1� ..\ (vi)ui ('T/N, vi)dF(vi)
i - i -
where 'T/�L denotes the JN--referendum mechanism with N individuals and 'T/N denotes the 
optimal mechanism with N individuals . 
Proof: Denote by "Y," the number of yes votes. By construction of j*, E[L:i wif NI"Y" = j* N] = k, so that if there are at least j* N votes, then the expected sum of virtual 
benefits is greater than or equal to KN. As N � oo, by the strong law of large numbers, 
the expected average virtual benefit when exactly j* fraction of the voters vote "Yes" will 
converge in probability to k. In other words, the probability that this JN- rule and the 
optimal rule make different production decisions for the same profile of types approaches 
0 in the limit. 
Now consider the reduced forms for the j*-referendum mechanism: 
where 
14Since N is finite, there is generally no exact value of j* satisfying this equality condition. What 
we mean precisely is that ((J;., - I)/N)E[w; v > k] + ((N - J;., + I)/N)E[w; v < k] S k and ((J;., + 
I)/N)E[w;v > k] + ((N - J;., - l)/N)E[w;v < k] � k. 
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and the interim-efficient mechanism 
Q!v(vi) 
A!v(vi) 
= Prob { L,#i wi(vi)/N 2: k - (wi(vi)/N)}; and
= fv_; a'f(v)dF(v). 
For large N, QJ?(vi) � Q!v(vi) for all vi. Incentive compatibility then implies that
for large N, A}?(vi) � A!v(vi) for all vi. Therefore, for large N,
Since all individuals are identical, this implies 
While this is a strong result, as far as justifying the use of simple dominant strategy 
mechanisms for public good decisions, it would be even nicer to have a stronger result. 
The reason to look for a stronger result is simple. One can show that in the limit, for 
any optimal public good mechanism, the limit of QN is either 0 or 1, depending on
the distribution of types and the welfare weights. Thus, using a similar argument as in 
the proof of the theorem above, one can show that any sequence of voting rules (or any
sequence of mechanisms in general), with the property that the expected production of the
public good in the limit is the same as the optimal mechanism (either 0 or 1, respectively),
will also generate the same per capita welfare benefits as the optimal mechanism. 
Suppose for example that E[w] > k. Then the command mechanism "always pro­
duce," while being suboptimal for any finite value of N (and worse than the best ref­
erendum, as well) generates the same per capita surplus as the optimal mechanism in
the limit, since there is almost surely production of q = 1 in the limit. Moreover, any 
j* N-referendum that fixes j* less than some critical level, is asymptotically optimal. 
Alternately, suppose that E[w] < k. Then the mechanism "never produce," while being
suboptimal for any finite value of N, generates the same per capita surplus as the optimal 
mechanism in the limit, since there is almost surely zero production in the limit. Obvi­
ously, this indeterminacy problem arises because the planner can compute the optimal 
limiting production decision ex ante. We next show that this indeterminacy of optimal 
referenda in the limit is no longer problematic if one considers a more realistic model 
in which the optimal limiting production decision is not known by the planner ex ante. 
We obtain below the much stronger result that, if there is ex ante uncertainty about the 
optimal limiting production decision, then there exists a uniquely optimal referendum 
rule, which is not a command mechanism. 
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5 .4 Common Values: Uniqueness of Approximately Optimal 
Referendum 
A simplifying assumption has been made in the above analysis, which is that the distribu­
tion of valuations is known by the planner. This simplification is convenient, but it is the 
source of the unsatisfying result in the previous subsection, that there is no uncertainty 
in the limit, so that any referendum - including a command mechanism - that leads to 
expected production that is the same as the (certain) limit of production under the opti­
mal mechanism. We now show that a natural generalization of the model demonstrates 
that for a given welfare weighting scheme there is generally a unique referendum rule 
that is approximately optimal in the limit. 
Define c to be the common value component which is added to everyone's private 
valuation, vi, to generate an adjusted individual valuation denoted Ti = vi + c. Thus c
is a parameter which shifts the distribution of valuations either up or down, depending 
on whether c is positive or negative, respectively. We continue to use the notation as 
before, where F(v) denotes the cdf of private valuations evaluated at v, and >.(v) denotes 
the welfare weight assigned to av-type. The common value component c is distributed 
according the continuous cdf, G(c). One can easily show that for sufficiently low values 
of c, the public good should never be produced, and for sufficiently high values of c, the 
public good should always be produced. We assume that the support of G is bounded, 
but large enough to include both these very high and very low values of c, where command 
mechanisms are optimal. Each individual observes Ti, and the planner only knows F15• 
We now consider optimal referenda under this alternative preference structure, with 
this common value uncertainty.16 We compare the per capita surplus under an optimal 
referendum to the per capita surplus the planner could achieve if the planner actually 
knew c, which is simply given by the cost-benefit criteria applied to the shifted distribu­
tion of valuations. This is clearly an upper bound on what an optimal mechanism could 
achieve when the planner does not know c. We show below that there exists a unique 
referendum that achieves this upper bound in the limit. 
Fix a weighting scheme, >.. Then , it is easy to see that, conditional on c, the optimal 
mechanism requires production if and only if the average virtual valuation exceeds k - c. 
That is, the cost-benefit criterion is simply shifted by the common value parameter. 
Denote by c* the critical value of c such that E[w(v); >.] = k - c*. That is, if c > c* then 
the public good should always be produced in the limit, and if c < c* it should never 
be produced in the limit. By the earlier assumption that G has a broad support, c* is 
in the interior of the support of G. Now consider the referendum defined uniquely 17 
15Neither the planner nor the individuals have to know G. 
16Since we are only considering behavior under dominant strategy mechanisms here, it is not actually 
necessary to specify any particular common knowledge structure for the players, beyond the fact that Ti 
is known by i. But for concreteness, let c be common knowledge among the individuals and assume Vi 
is private information as before, with common prior beliefs about v given by F. When we refer to "the
optimal mechanism" below, we mean optimal relative to this information structure. 
17Moreover, j* must be strictly between 0 and 1, since c* is in the interior of the support of G, so the
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by E[L:i wif N I #{ i : Vi + c* 2 k} = j*) = k - c*. Voters have a dominant strategyto vote yes if and only if Vi + c > k. This referendum is constructed so that, in the
event c = c*, the expected average virtual valuation, conditional on the proportion of yes
voters exactly equaling the referendum threshold j*, is equal to k - c*. Thus, if c < c*
this referendum will always fail to produce the public good in the limit, while if c > c* 
the referendum will always produce the public good in the limit. By the argument of the 
previous subsection, the expected per capita welfare losses conditional on c go to 0 for 
every value of c (in fact, uniformly in c), except possibly at c*. Therefore the expected
per capita losses (integrating over G(c)) go to 0 for this referendum.
Are other referenda optimal for this weighting scheme? No. For any j-referendum 
with j > j*, there exists a critical common value, c** > c*, such that public good is only 
produced in the limit for realizations of c > c**· Thus, for realizations of c between c* 
and c**, the public good will inefficiently fail to be produced in the limit, even though 
the c-conditional optimal mechanism requires production in the limit with probability 
approaching 1. This generates a strictly positive per capita welfare loss, conditional on c, 
on the order of c - c* for realizations of c between c* and c**· Thus, integrating over G(c), 
the expected per capit;;i, welfare loss is strictly positive in the limit for any j-referendum 
with j < j*. A similar argument applies for any j- referendum with j < j*. 
5 .5 Total Welfare Losses from j* N-Referenda
A stronger criterion for asymptotic efficiency is the total (as opposed to per capita)
surplus loss of the j* N-referendum compared to the optimal mechanism. We prove below 
that the total surplus loss from using the optimal referendum instead of the optimal 
virtual cost-benefit criterion goes to zero in the limit. We prove this for the pure private 
values model (without the common value shift parameter), but it is a straightforward
exercise to demonstrate that the same result holds for the more general model with the 
shift parameter. Moreover, for reasons shown in the previous section, the more general 
result is uniquely true for the referendum rule defined by E[L:i wif N I #{ i : Vi + c* 2k} = j*] = k - c*.
By symmetry, the total expected welfare from the optimal mechanism is equal to: 
and the expected welfare from a j* N-referendum is: 
wt•= N lv .-\(v)(v - k)Q�(v)dF(v).
Therefore, the difference in the expected total welfare (i.e., the expected welfare loss) is 
equal to: 
j*-referendum is not a command mechanism. 
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Theorem: 2 Let KN = kN, k fixed. Let >.i(vi) = >.(vi) and Fi(vi) = F(vi), Vi. Let j*satisfy j*w+ + (1 - j*)w- = k. Then the j* N- referendum is asymptotically interim­
efficient in the sense that it satisfies (I) and (F) and:
lim �wt• ---+ 0. N-+oo 
Proof: From above, 
�wt• = N Lv >.(v)(v - k)(Q'f..,(v) - Q1.;(v))dF(v)
-N Lv >.(v)(A'fv(v) - kQ'f..,(v))dF(v)
Thus, the expected welfare loss is divided into two terms. The magnitude of the first 
term is on the order of N times the average expected differences in the reduced form
production decisions, Q/v and Q1.;. The magnitude of the second term is on the order
of N times the expected difference between equal cost sharing in the referendum and
incentive compatible cost sharing in the optimal mechanism. We apply a central limit 
theorem below to show that both of these converge to 0 in N, although we find that
convergence occurs at an order of magnitude faster rate for the second term than the 
first. 
We begin by considering the first term, NJ: >.(v)(v-k)(Q!v(v)-Q1.;(v)) dF(v). Recall
that both Q/v and Q1.; are deterministic in the limit (i.e., equal either 0 or 1) . Thus if
j* is not chosen so that Q1.; � Q!v, then we know that the expected welfare loss goes to
infinity. However, we know from above that for j* satisfying E[L,i wif N I #{ i : vi � k}= j*] = k we are guaranteed that Q1.; � Q/v. Thus, we only need to obtain a rate of
convergence to 0 for Q1.;- Q°N and show that this converges to 0 very fast. We show
below that the speed of convergence is at least on the order of ../N e-N, so N times the
expected difference in interim quantities converges to 0, and hence the first term goes to 
0 in N. 
In the optimal mechanism, the good is produced if and only if L,i wif N � k. Thus,for an individual with private value equal to vi, the interim expected output under
the optimal mechanism is simply the probability that the sum of all the other virtual 
valuations is greater than or equal to Nk - w(vi) which equals the probability that
the sample· average virtual valuation of the other players is greater than or equal to 
[Nk-w(vi)Jl(N-l). Denoting the expected value of the virtual valuation of an individual
as w, we know from the Central Limit Theorem that the sample average virtual valuation 
of N -l has an asymptotically Normal distribution with mean w and standard deviation
uw/(N - 1) , where Uw is the standard deviation of w. Thus, we get
Qo ( ) ---+ 1 _ <l> 
- W - - N-1 [ (- k) (�)] 
N V Uw/(N - 1) 
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where <I> is the cumulative of the unit Normal distribution. Similarly, we can obtain an 
expression for the asymptotic value of Q�(v). It depends only on whether or not v is 
greater than or less thank. Denote by b(v) the vote of an individual of type v, which is 
equal to 1 if v is greater than or equal to k and equals 0 if v is less than k. Denote by b
the ex ante probability of a yes vote (which is simply equal to 1 - F(k)), and which also 
equals the expected fraction of individuals voting yes. Then by a similar argument, we 
get that 
Q�(v) � 1 - <I> [-(b 
- j*) -
(� )] 
ab/(N - 1) 
where ab is the variance of b. 
By construction of j"', limN_,00 Q/v(v) = limN_,00 Q�(v). That is, b - j* > 0 if and 




• 1 [BN 2/ Q!v(v) - Q�(v) � Jill JAN e-x 2dx
AN=_ 
'1N(b - j*) _ b(v) - j* 
ab ab.JN 
BN = 




Without loss of generality, assume that "b-j* > w-k, so that, for sufficiently large N,
lTb Uw 
AN< BN. Then for large N, 
Qo ( ) Qj*( ) Nl/2 (b - j* W -k) 1 -N(w-k)2V - N V � -- - -- -e ow N ab aw 2II 
Therefore, the expected difference between the interim expected quantities under the 
optimal mechanism and the j* mechanism, N(Q/v(v)-Q� (v)) ,  is on the order of N312e-N,
which converges to 0 in N. This establishes that the first term of the expression for the 
total surplus loss goes to 0. 
The second term of that expression is 
N Lv A(v) (A!v(v) - kQ!v(v))dF(v)
This can be rewritten as 
Lv A(v) [N(A!v(v) - A) - Nk(Q!v(v) - Q)]dF(v) .
which can be further broken down into two terms: 
Lv A(v)N(A!v(v) - A)dF(v)
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and 
Consider the second of these terms. Because A(v) is bounded, we just need to show 
that 
lv N I  Q'J.., (v) - Q) I dF(v) ---+ 0.
The expression I Q'Jv(v) - Q) I is less than or equal to Q'Jv(v) - Q'Jv(11.) , so we only need
to show that 
lv N[Q'J.., (v) - Q'J.., (11.))dF(v) = N[Q'J.., (v) - Q'J.., (11.)] ---+ o.
Recall that Q'Jv ( v) = prob{ w - N� 1 � ��f} so, using an argument similar to the one






Q'J.., (v) - Q'J.., (11.) � . rrrr; e-x 12dx 
V 2Il AN 
AN = 
_ v'N(w - k) _ w(11.) - k 
aw awv'N 
BN = 
_ v'N(w - k) _ w(v) - k 
aw awv'N 
This is on the order of Y7V e-N , so N[Q'Jv(v) - Q'Jv(11.)] ---+ 0 as N ---+ oo. Therefore
lv A(v)Nk(Q'J.., (v) - Q)dF(v) ---+ O
as desired. By incentive compatibility, A' = vQ' , and by assumption v < v < oo, so it 
also follows that 
lv A(v)N(A'J.., (v) - A)dF(v) ---+ O.
Thus limN-+oo b.. wt• ---+ 0. QED.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have characterized the interim efficient public good allocation rules in 
a simple Bayesian public good environment, and have explored the use of simple voting 
schemes to approximately implements these rules. We find that the optimal mechanism 
involves either more or less production of the public good depending on whether the 
welfare weights are shifted in the direction of types with higher or lower valuations for the 
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public good. Thus, compared to the classical optimal level of public good provision (the 
"Lindahl-Samuelson" solution) , there should generally be some distortion. The reason 
for this distortion is that unless welfare weights are perfectly neutral, efficient allocations 
will depend in general on both the level of public good and the incidence of taxes to 
finance the public good. Because of incentive compatibility, the efficient way to reduce 
the tax burden on low-valuation (resp: high-valuation) consumers is to reduce (resp: 
increase) the level of provision of the public good. In the borderline case, the first-best 
solution is attainable only because the welfare function is independent of distribution of 
the private good. 
We further show that for any interim efficient allocation rule there exists a simple 
dominant-strategy referendum mechanism which approximates the efficiency of that al­
location rule in large populations. In a referendum, individuals simply submit a binary 
message (a "vote" ) either for or against production of the public good. If a sufficiently 
large fraction of the individuals vote in favor, then the public good is provided and the 
costs are distributed equally in the population. Otherwise, the public good is not pro­
duced. This provides an approximate "first welfare theorem" for public goods: efficient 
allocation rules can be . (approximately) decentralized by an appropriately chosen voting 
rule. Moreover, if there is a common value component to the distribution of preferences, 
then the optimal referendum is unique. 
There are several directions in which it would be useful to extend these results. First, 
the asymptotic results were obtained under an assumption on the distribution of types 
that guaranteed that the solution to the optimal control problem was "regular." This 
allowed us to conduct the analysis using only the first order conditions. In a completely 
general setup, we would have to include inequality constraints that could be binding if 
the interim utility as a function of type were not strictly convex. We expect that the 
main results would still hold up, but the optimal solution would involve "pooling" of 
types. Since the referenda we use are an extreme form of pooling of types, the results on 
approximate optimality of referenda should be unaffected. 
Second, we note that participation constraints were not imposed in our solution for 
the optimum. It is fairly easy to show that when these constraints are binding, this 
implies a reduction in the level of the public good, since these constraints are necessarily 
binding on the low valuation types (Ledyard and Palfrey 1994) . It is also true that, 
except in uninteresting cases, these constraints will imply QN -+ 0 in large populations 
(Ledyard and Palfrey 1994, Mailath and Postlewaite 1990). But for the case of large N, it 
would usually seem more realistic to assume that participation is generally obligatory to 
all members of the group under consideration, as we have assumed here. Related to the 
general issue of participation is the application of the general approach presented here 
to excludable public goods, an extension that we will pursue in another paper. In that 
case, participation constraints can be dramatically relaxed by the (no-cost) exclusion of 
low valuation types. 
Our results about the asymptotic optimality of referenda were obtained by replicating 
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a population with the same distribution of types. In the case where distributions differ 
across the population, optimal referenda might involve asymmetric cost shares, although 
we conjecture that referenda with equal voting weight will still be asymptotically efficient. 
More involved extensions, such as relaxing the assumption of independent types, consid­
ering a more general form of common values, or introducing multidimensional types, 
remain difficult open questions. 
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